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Abstract. In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well-
studied KP model [18] for selfish routing that reflects some influence from
the much older Wardrop model [31]. In the new model, user traffics are
still unsplittable, while social cost is now the expectation of the sum,
over all links, of a certain polynomial evaluated at the total latency in-
curred by all users choosing the link; we call it polynomial social cost.
The polynomials that we consider have non-negative coefficients. We are
interested in evaluating Nash equilibria in this model, and we use the
Price of Anarchy as our evaluation measure. We prove the Fully Mixed
Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for identical users and two links, and estab-
lish an approximate version of the conjecture for arbitrary many links.
Moreover, we give upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy.
1 Introduction
Motivation and Framework. The Price of Anarchy, also known as coordi-
nation ratio, has been defined in a seminal work by Koutsoupias and Papadim-
itriou [18] as a measure of the extent to which competition approximates cooper-
ation. In general, the Price of Anarchy is the worst-case ratio between the value
of a social objective function, usually coined as social cost, in some equilibrium
state of a system, and that of some social optimum. Usually, the equilibrium
state has been taken to be that of a Nash equilibrium [24] – a state in which no
user wishes to leave unilaterally its own strategy in order to improve the value
of its private objective function, also known as individual cost. So, the Price
of Anarchy represents a rendezvous of Nash equilibrium, a concept fundamen-
tal to Game Theory, with approximation, an ubiquitous concept in Theoretical
Computer Science today (see, e.g., [30]).
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The setting considered by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18], now widely
known as the KP model, involves a network of m parallel links and a collection
of n selfish users with traffics w1, . . . , wn which are unsplittable. The latency in-
curred at a link is the total traffic of users choosing it. Expected latency makes
sense in case users’ strategies are mixed, i.e., when they are probability distri-
butions over the links. The individual cost of a user over a link is the expected
latency it would experience had it chosen the link. In a Nash equilibrium, each
user is minimizing its individual cost. The social cost is the expectation of max-
imum (over links) latency; the social optimum is the least possible maximum
latency. Recently, there has been a lot of flourishing interest and attention into
the KP model; see, e.g., [3, 9, 11, 15, 17, 22]. The resulting research is overviewed
in three authoritative surveys [7, 12, 16].
A much older theoretical model for selfish routing in transportation networks
due to Wardrop [31] dates back to the 1950s. In this model, users’ traffics are
infinitesimally splittable, a feature that rules out mixed strategies from consider-
ation. In addition, social cost is defined here as the sum of the individual costs
(those being taken as the sum of latencies, determined by convex functions of
the total traffics, along paths). Wardrop’s model, and, in particular, the incurred
Price of Anarchy, has been reinvestigated in many recent works [19, 26–29].
On a middle ground, some recent research [14, 20] has attempted to under-
stand the dependence of the Price of Anarchy on the particular assumptions
made in the adopted model for selfish routing. In this direction, [14, 20] has each
considered a hybridization of the KP model and the Wardrop model. In this
paper, we further address this line of research by introducing and studying a
new, yet interesting variant of the KP model that reflects some influence from
the Wardrop model.
In the proposed model, traffics are unsplittable, which makes it interesting
to study mixed strategies, and the network consists of parallel links as in the
KP model; however, we define social cost as the expectation of a certain sum
of link latencies, as opposed to expectation of maximum latency adopted in the
KP model. The idea of summing (over links) comes from the Wardrop model,
although social cost is defined there as the sum of individual costs (over users).
An additional influence from the Wardrop model lies in modeling each latency
cost function as a certain polynomial of total traffic of users choosing the link. So,
social cost is now the expectation of a sum of polynomial functions, and we call
it polynomial social cost. The polynomials that we consider have non-negative
coefficients.
Restricted to pure Nash equilibria, our model was already studied for mono-
tone functions in [8], and, restricted to polynomials of degree 2 in [20]. Restricted
to identical users, it is a particular instance of what is known as congestion
game [23, 25]. See below for more on related work.
Contribution and Significance. We study a natural conjecture asserting that
the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F, that is, the Nash equilibrium where each
user chooses each link with non-zero probability, is the worst Nash equilibrium
with respect to social cost:
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Conjecture 1 (Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture). For any traffic vector
w and for any Nash equilibrium P, SCpid(δ)(w,P) ≤ SCpid(δ)(w,F).
In the following, we refer to this conjecture as the FMNE Conjecture. More-
over, we investigate the Price of Anarchy. Our results address the following two
important special cases of the problem:
1. The case of identical users: To analyze this case, we first show that the poly-
nomial social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is a certain combina-
torial sum of Stirling numbers of the second kind. Moreover, the polynomial
social cost of any (mixed) Nash equilibrium can be bounded from above by
a sum of binomial cost functions, which again turns out to be certain combi-
natorial sum of Stirling numbers of the second kind. By considering terms of
the same power pairwise, this enables us to prove that the polynomial social
cost of any Nash equilibrium is bounded by the polynomial social cost of the
fully mixed Nash equilibrium for the case of 2 links. This implies the validity
of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for this special case, in our
model. Equipped now with the validity of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Conjecture, we prove an exact bound of 12 (2
d−1 + 1) on the Price of Anar-
chy for the special case where the polynomial is just the dth power, for any
integer d ≥ 1. We also obtain an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy for
the general case of polynomials with non-negative coefficients.
We then generalize these results to the case of many links. Using similar
techniques as in the case of 2 links, we prove that the polynomial social cost
of any arbitrary (mixed) Nash equilibrium is no more than (1+ 1
n−1 )
d times
the polynomial social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium. This implies
the validity of an approximate version of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Conjecture, in our model. Again, making use of this result, we prove that the
Price of Anarchy is bounded from above by (1 + 1
n−1 )
d ·Bd, where Bd is the
dth Bell number. We also obtain an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy
for the general case of polynomials with non-negative coefficients.
2. The case of pure Nash equilibria: We finally consider the special case of pure
Nash equilibria. Through elegant combinatorial arguments, we prove a tight
bound of (2
d−1)d
(d−1)(2d−2)d−1
(
d−1
d
)d
on the Price of Anarchy for the same special
case where the polynomial is just the dth power, for any integer d ≥ 2.
Related Work and Comparison. The KP model has been studied extensively
in the recent years; see, e.g., [9, 11, 15, 17, 20, 22]. Mavronicolas and Spirakis [22]
introduced the fully mixed Nash equilibrium. They showed that, in case it exists,
the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is unique. Gairing et al. [15] were the first who
stated explicitly the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture. Up to now, the
conjecture could be proved only for several particular cases of the KP model
[15, 21]. A proof of the conjecture will enable the derivation of upper bounds on
Price of Anarchy via studying the fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
Lu¨cking et al. [20] considered a hybridization of the KP model with the
Wardrop model that adopts quadratic social cost, defined as the sum of weighted
individual costs. Their model is a special case of our model where the polynomial
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is just the second power. In this model, Lu¨cking et al. [20] proved the FMNE
Conjecture in case of identical users and identical links.
Gairing et al. [14] introduced yet another model for selfish routing that adopts
arbitrary convex latency cost functions and the social cost as the sum of indi-
vidual costs. This model is identical to our model exactly in the case of identical
users and linear cost functions. However, in general the models differ in the def-
inition of individual cost. Hence, the models also differ in the Nash conditions,
and thus the sets of mixed Nash equilibria are different. Gairing et al. [14] proved
again the FMNE Conjecture in their model.
Tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy for the KP model have been shown to
be Θ( log mlog log m ) if all links are identical [9, 17] and Θ(
log m
log log log m ) if links may have
varying capacities [9]. The Price of Anarchy has also been studied for a network
creation game in [10] and a network design game in [2].
The Wardrop model was already studied in the 1950’s [5, 31] in the context
of road traffic systems. Wardrop [31] introduced the concept of equilibrium to
describe user behavior in this kind of traffic networks. For a survey of the early
work on this model see [4]. A lot of subsequent work on this model has been
motivated by Braess’s Paradox [6]. Inspired by the new interest in the Price of
Anarchy, Roughgarden and Tardos [27–29] re-investigated the Wardrop model.
For a survey of results we refer to [12] and references therein.
Road Map. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summa-
rizes some mathematical preliminaries that will be used throughout the paper.
Section 3 introduces our formal model and recalls some preliminary facts. In
Section 4, we consider the case of identical users and two links. In Section 5, we
turn our attention to the more general case of identical users. The case of pure
Nash equilibria is treated in Section 6.
2 Mathematical Preliminaries
For all i ∈
 
we denote [i] = {1, · · · , i}.
Falling Factorials, Stirling Numbers and Bell Numbers. For any pair of
integers x ≥ 1 and i ≥ 0, the ith falling factorial xi is given by xi = x · (x −
1) · · · (x− i). For any pair of integers d ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ i ≤ d, the Stirling number of
the second kind S(d, i) counts the number of partitions of a set with d elements
into exactly i blocks (non-empty subsets). In particular, S(d, 0) is taken to be 0,
while S(d, 1) = S(d, d) = 1. Also, for all d ≥ 2, S(d, 2) = 2d−1 − 1. It is known
that for all integers d ≥ 1, it holds that
x
d = 
1≤i≤d
S(d, i) · xi−1. (1)
This implies that the Stirling numbers of the second kind are the connecting
coefficients between the sequence of powers and the sequence of falling factorials.
For any integer d ≥ 1, the Bell number Bd counts the number of partitions of
a set with d elements into blocks. Thus, Bd =
∑
1≤i≤d S(d, i). For a textbook
introduction to falling factorials, Stirling numbers of the second kind and Bell
numbers, see [1, Chapters II & III].
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Binomial Cost Functions. We now give the definition and a technical lemma
on the binomial cost function H(p, g). We will see later that polynomial social
cost of a mixed Nash equilibrium can be expressed as sum of binomial cost
functions.
Definition 1. For a set of r probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pr) and a function g :
 
→   define
H(p, g) = 
A⊆[r]

k∈A
pk

k/∈A
(1 − pk) · g(|A|).
In the same way, we define a function H(p˜, r, g) by replacing p with a vector of r
probabilities all equal to p˜. In case that g(δ) = δd, we write Hd(p) and Hd(p˜, r),
respectively.
Note, that in case of equal probabilities
H(p˜, r, g) = 
1≤k≤r

r
k 
p˜
k(1 − p˜)r−k · g(k). (2)
Throughout the paper, we will use several times the following technical fact
which has been proved in [14].
Lemma 1 (Gairing et al. [14]). Let g be convex and define p = (p1, . . . , pr)
and p˜ =  i∈[r]
pi
r
. Then H(p, g) ≤ H(p˜, r, g).
The following proposition, proved in the appendix, will be extensively used in
the remainder of the paper.
Proposition 1. For the binomial cost function Hd(p, r) we have
Hd(p, r) = 
1≤i≤d
p
i · S(d, i) · ri−1.
3 Model and Preliminaries
General. We consider a network consisting of a set of m parallel links 1, 2, . . . , m
from a source node to a destination node. Each of n network users 1, 2, . . . , n, or
users for short, wishes to route a particular amount of traffic along a (non-fixed)
link from source to destination. Denote wi the traffic of user i ∈ [n]. In the
model of identical users, all user traffics are equal to 1; user traffics may vary
arbitrarily in the model of arbitrary users. Define the n × 1 traffic vector w in
the natural way. Assume throughout that m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
A pure strategy for user i ∈ [n] is some specific link. A mixed strategy for user
i ∈ [n] is a probability distribution over pure strategies; thus, a mixed strategy is
a probability distribution over the set of links. The support of the mixed strategy
for user i ∈ [n], denoted support(i), is the set of those pure strategies (links) to
which i assigns positive probability. The view of a link j ∈ [m], denoted view(j),
is the set of users which assign their traffics to j with non-zero probability. A
pure strategy profile is represented by an n-tuple 〈`1, `2, . . . , `n〉 ∈ [m]
n; a mixed
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strategy profile is represented by an n×m probability matrix P of nm probabilities
pij , i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], where pij is the probability that user i chooses link j.
For a probability matrix P, the support of the mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n]
is the set {j ∈ [m] | pij > 0}. A mixed strategy profile P is fully mixed [22,
Section 2.2] if for all users i ∈ [n] and links j ∈ [m], pij > 0. Throughout, we
will cast a pure strategy profile as a special case of a mixed strategy profile.
System and Cost Measures. For a pure strategy profile 〈`1, `2, . . . , `n〉, the
latency cost for user i ∈ [n] is λi =
∑
k:`k=`i
wk; that is, the latency of the link
it chooses. For a mixed strategy profile P, denote δj the actual traffic on link
j ∈ [m]; so, δj is a random variable. For each link j ∈ [m], define the expected
latency Λj as the expected traffic on link j; thus, Λj = E(δj) =
∑
i∈[n] pijwi.
For a mixed strategy profile P, the expected latency cost for user i ∈ [n] on link
j ∈ [m], denoted λij , is the expectation, over all random choices of the remaining
users, of the latency cost for user i had its traffic been assigned to link j; thus,
λij = wi+
∑
k=1,k 6=i pkjwk = (1−pij)wi+Λj . For each user i ∈ [n], the minimum
expected latency cost, denoted λi, is the minimum, over all links j ∈ [m], of the
expected latency cost for user i on link j; thus, λi = minj∈[m] λij .
Let pid(δ) =
∑
0≤t≤d atδ
t be a polynomial of degree d ≥ 1 with non-negative
coefficients (that is, at ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ d). Associated with a traffic vector
w, a polynomial cost function pid(δ), and a mixed strategy profile P is the poly-
nomial social cost, or social cost for short, denoted SCpid(δ)(w,P), which is the
expectation of the sum of the polynomial pid(δ) evaluated at the incurred link
latencies:
SCpid(δ)(w,P) = E   
j∈[m]
pi
d( 
k:`k=j
wk) 
= 
j∈[m]

A⊆[n]


i∈A
pij

 


i6∈A
(1− pij)  pi
d( 
k:`k=j
wk).
If we restrict to the polynomial pid(δ) = δd, we write SCδd(w,P). Note that
SCpid(δ)(w,P) = 
0≤t≤d
at · SCδt (w,P). (3)
Moreover, if we restrict to identical users, the formula for social cost reduces to
SCpid(δ)(w,P) = 
j∈[m]

A⊆[n]


i∈A
pij

 


i6∈A
(1− pij)  pi
d(|A|)
= 
j∈[m]
H((p1j, . . . , pnj), pi
d(δj)). (4)
The optimum associated with a traffic vector w, denoted OPTpid(δ)(w), is the
least possible sum of the polynomial pid(δ) evaluated at the incurred link latencies.
Note that while SCpid(δ)(w,P) is defined in relation to a mixed strategy profile
P, OPTpid(δ)(w) refers to the optimum pure strategy profile.
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Nash Equilibria. We are interested in a special class of mixed strategies called
Nash equilibria [24] that we describe below. Formally, the probability matrix P
is a Nash equilibrium [18, Section 2] if for all users i ∈ [n] and links j ∈ [m],
λij = λi if Iij = 1, and λij ≥ λi if Iij = 0. Thus, each user assigns its traffic with
positive probability only on links (possibly more than one of them) for which
its expected latency cost is minimized; this implies that there is no incentive for
a user to unilaterally deviate from its mixed strategy in order to avoid links on
which its expected latency cost is higher than necessary. We will refer to this
conditions as Nash conditions. Depending on the type of strategy profile, we
differ between pure, mixed and fully mixed Nash equilibria. Recall that in our
model, the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F exists always, and that it is unique
(see [22]).
Lemma 2 (Mavronicolas and Spirakis [22]). Consider the model of arbi-
trary users. Then, there exists a unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium F with
fij = 1/m, for any user i ∈ [n] and link j ∈ [m].
Price of Anarchy. The Price of Anarchy, also called coordination ratio, is the
maximum value, over all traffic vectors w and Nash equilibria P of the ratio
SCpid(δ)(w,P)/OPTpid(δ)(w).
4 Identical Users and Two Links
In this section we turn our attention to the case of identical users and two
links. We first use Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 to prove the FMNE Conjecture
(Theorem 1). Making use of this result, we then give a tight bound on the Price
of Anarchy for the special case where the polynomial cost function is just the
dth power (Theorem 2). We close with an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy
for general polynomial cost functions (Corollary 1).
Lemma 3 (Lu¨cking et al. [20]). Consider the model of arbitrary users, and
let j, k ∈ [m]. If view(j)   view(k), then Λj > Λk.
Theorem 1. Consider the model of identical users and two links. Then, for any
Nash equilibrium P, SCpid(δ)(w,P) ≤ SCpid(δ)(w,F).
Proof. Fix any Nash equilibrium P. We can identify three sets of users in P:
U1 = {i : support(i) = {1}}, U2 = {i : support(i) = {2}} and U12 = {i :
support(i) = {1, 2}}. Without loss of generality let |U1| ≤ |U2|. Denote u = |U1|,
v = |U2| − u and r = |U12|.
The proof of the theorem is structured as follows: we first prove that the
claim holds if P is a pure Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the case where
u = 0. We show that it suffices to consider terms of the same power pairwise.
To do so, we proceed by induction on i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, and we show that the claim
holds for ith powers. For the case where u > 0, we introduce a Nash equilibrium
Q as a perturbation of F with a special structure that is similar to the structure
of P such that SCpid(δ)(w,Q) ≤ SCpid(δ)(w,F). Due to this special structure, Q
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can be compared with P more easily. To compare the two, we use the fact that
the claim holds for u = 0. We now continue with the details of the formal proof:
First, let P be a pure Nash equilibrium, that is, r = 0. Due to the Nash
conditions, |U1| and |U2| differ by 1 if n is odd, and |U1| = |U2| otherwise.
Thus, each pure Nash equilibrium P has unique social cost SCpid(δ)(w,P) =
OPTpid(δ)(w), proving the claim for pure Nash equilibria.
Now let P be an arbitrary (non-pure) Nash equilibrium.
Case 1: u = 0: Denote by Λ1 and Λ2 the latency on link 1 and 2, respectively.
Due to Lemma 3, view(1)   view(2) implies Λ1 > Λ2. First assume r = 1. Then,
the Nash condition for the mixed user 1 = 1 + v implies v = 0. This contradicts
our assumption that n ≥ 2. So, assume that 2 ≤ r ≤ n − 1 (mixed) users are
assigned to both links, and that n− r (pure) users are assigned to link 2.
Consider any arbitrary mixed user i ∈ U12. Then, the Nash condition implies
Λ1 − pi1 + 1 = Λ2 − pi2 + 1 = Λ2 + pi1 ⇒ pi1 =
Λ1 − Λ2 + 1
2
.
Since this holds for each mixed user, we write p(1) and p(2) for the probabilities
of each mixed user on link 1 and 2, respectively. Since p(2) = 1− p(1), the Nash
condition
(r − 1) · p(1) + 1 = (r − 1) · p(2) + n − r + 1 = (r − 1) · (1− p(1)) + n− r + 1
for the mixed users implies
p(1) =
n − 1
2(r − 1)
=
1
2
+
n− r
2(r − 1)
and p(2) = (1 − p(1)) =
1
2
−
n− r
2(r − 1)
.
Thus, we can write
Λ1 = r · p(1) = r ·
 
1
2
+
n− r
2(r − 1) 
=
n
2
+
n− r
2(r − 1)
= α + β,
where α = n2 and β =
n−r
2(r−1) with 0 < β <
1
2 . Moreover, Λ2 = n− Λ1 = α − β.
By Equation (3), we can write SCpid(δ)(w,P) =
∑
0≤t≤d at · SCδt(w,P) for any
Nash equilibrium P. Since the coefficients at are non-negative, it suffices to prove
that SCδt(w,P) ≤ SCδt(w,F) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ d.
Consider the average probabilities p˜(1) = Λ1
r
= α+β
r
and p˜(2) = Λ2
n
= α−β
n
on link 1 and 2, respectively. Since δt is convex, we can apply Lemma 1 to derive
the upper bound
SCδt (w,P)
(4)
= Ht((p(1), . . . , p(1)
  
r
)) + Ht((p(2), . . . , p(2)
  
r
, 1, . . . , 1
  
n−r
))
Lem. 1
≤ Ht(p˜(1), r) + Ht(p˜(2), n) = Ht(
α + β
r
, r) + Ht(
α− β
n
, n)
Prop. 1
= 
1≤i≤t
 
α + β
r 
i
· S(t, i) · ri−1 + 
1≤i≤t
 
α− β
n 
i
· S(t, i) · ni−1
= 
1≤i≤t
S(t, i) ·  (α + β)i ·
ri−1
ri
+ (α− β)i ·
ni−1
ni 	
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Moreover, by Lemma 2, we have
SCδt(w, F)
(4)
= 2 · Ht(
1
2
, n) = 2 · Ht(
α
n
, n)
Prop. 1
= 
1≤i≤t
S(t, i)  2αi ·
ni−1
ni 	
.
In order to prove the claim it suffices to show that
∆ = 2αi ·
ni−1
ni
−  (α + β)i ·
ri−1
ri
+ (α− β)i ·
ni−1
ni 	
≥ 0
for all i ≥ 1. For i = 1, we have ∆ = 2α− [α + β + α− β] = 0, proving the basis
case. So assume i ≥ 2. We have
∆ = 2αi ·
ni−1
ni
−  

(α + β) ·
r − (i− 1)
r
· (α + β)i−1 ·
ri−2
ri−1
  
≥0
+ (α− β) ·
n − (i− 1)
n
· (α − β)i−1 ·
ni−2
ni−1
  
≥0
 


.
The function
f(r) = (α + β) ·
r − (i− 1)
r
=
 
(n− 1)r
2(r − 1) 
·
r − (i− 1)
r
=
n − 1
2
·
r − (i− 1)
r − 1
is monotonic increasing in r for all i ≥ 2, and thus
∆ ≥ 2αi ·
ni−1
ni
−  α ·
n− (i− 1)
n
· (α + β)i−1 ·
ri−2
ri−1
+ α ·
n− (i− 1)
n
· (α− β)i−1 ·
ni−2
ni−1 	
= 2αi ·
ni−1
ni
− α ·
n − (i − 1)
n
·  (α + β)i−1 ·
ri−2
ri−1
+ (α− β)i−1 ·
ni−2
ni−1 	
ind.
≥ 2αi ·
ni−1
ni
− α ·
n − (i − 1)
n
· 2αi−1 ·
ni−2
ni−1
= 0,
proving the inductive claim. This finishes the case where u = 0.
Case 2: u > 0: Consider the following mixed Nash equilibrium Q. On both links,
there are u pure users, and the remaining n− 2u users have probabilities q(1) =
q(2) = 12 . Since pi
d(δ) is convex and due to Lemma 1, we have SCpid(δ)(w,F) ≥
SCpid(δ)(w,Q). As in case 1, it suffices to show that SCδt(w,Q) ≥ SCδt(w,P)
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ d. Denote n˜ = n− 2u. If n˜ = 1, then SCδt(w,P) = SCδt(w,Q) =
(u + 1)t + ut. Thus, assume n˜ ≥ 2. We have
SCδt (w,Q)
(4),(2)
= 2 · 
0≤k≤n˜

n˜
k 
q(1)k(1− q(1))n˜−k(k + u)t = SC(δ+u)t(w˜, Q˜),
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and by Lemma 1, Equation (4) and Equation (2)
SCδt (w,P) ≤ 
0≤k≤r

r
k

p(1)k(1 − p(1))r−k(k + u)t
+ 
0≤k≤n˜

n˜
k 
(1− p(1))kp(1)n˜−k(k + u)t
= H(p(1), r, (δ + u)t) + H(p(2), n˜, (δ + u)t) = SC(δ+u)t(w˜, P˜)
where w˜ is an instance with n˜ ≥ 2 identical users, Q˜ is the fully mixed Nash
equilibrium of this instance, and P˜ is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium where with
the same structure as in case 1, that is, there are no pure users on link 1. Since
(δ + u)t is a polynomial of degree t with non-negative coefficients, we can apply
case 1, proving the claim. ut
Theorem 2. Consider the model of identical users and two links. Then
max
w,P
SCδd(w,P)
OPTδd(w)
=
1
2  
2d−1 + 1  .
Corollary 1. Consider the model of identical users and two links. Then
max
w,P
SCpid(δ)(w,P)
OPTpid(δ)(w)
≤
1
2  
2d + d− 1

.
5 Identical Users
In this section we first prove the validity of an approximate version of the FMNE
Conjecture for the model of identical users (Theorem 3). Equipped with this
result, we then give a bound on the Price of Anarchy for the special case where
the polynomial cost function is just the dth power (Theorem 4), using similar
techniques as in [14]. We close with an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy for
general polynomial cost functions (Corollary 2).
Theorem 3. Consider the model of identical users. Then, for any Nash equi-
librium P,
SCpid(δ)(w, P) ≤
 
1 +
1
n− 1 
d
· SCpid(δ)(w,F).
Theorem 4. Consider the model of identical users. Then
max
w,P
SCδd(w,P)
OPTδd(w)
≤
 
1 +
1
n − 1 
d
·Bd.
The upper bound on the Price of Anarchy in Theorem 4 consists of two factors.
We believe that the factor (1+ 1
n−1 )
d is not necessary. Note also, that the second
factor Bd exceeds (asymptotically) the tight bound
1
2 (2
d−1 + 1) on the Price of
Anarchy established in Theorem 2 for the case of two links.
Corollary 2. Consider the model of identical users. Then
max
w,P
SCpid(δ)(w,P)
OPTpid(δ)(w)
≤ 
0≤t≤d
 
1 +
1
n− 1 
t
·Bt.
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6 Pure Nash Equilibria
We now prove a tight bound on the Price of Anarchy for pure Nash equilibria
for the special case that pid(δ) = δd.
Theorem 5. Consider the model of arbitrary users, restricted to pure Nash equi-
libria P, and let d ≥ 2. Then,
max
w,P
SCδd(w,P)
OPTδd(w)
=
(2d − 1)d
(d− 1)(2d − 2)d−1
 
d− 1
d 
d
.
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